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What is EUrope?

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There is discussion going on in Europe, a discussion on where we stand and where we want to go to. The most visible part of this discussion to the outside is the Enlargement process, with 14 new members queuing up to join the club of present 15 member states. Another strand of debate is visible in the Convention process, where Europe tries to settle for a common constitution. There are hidden influences, reflecting the core question that is hardly ever asked: This is the question of IDENTITY - What is Europe today and what does it want to be?

This is in brief the frame of contents I want to share with you today. As a first step I thought it might be convenient to get an overview on the facts "what Europe definitely is" before we steer into deeper waters and discuss what Europe might be or might become. And finally, I am going to give you an overview on the two most important contemporary developments, the Enlargement and the Convention processes.

1. The basic facts

Without much doubt, the early stages of the EU were strongly determined by both, the Second World War and the Cold War period afterwards. The western part of Post-war-Europe was strongly dependent on the US, the trade deficits built up to higher amounts every year – and the tendency of a Germany getting stronger and stronger again made the neighbours vigilant. So, already in **1947** Winston **Churchill** spoke about "a kind of **United States of Europe**" (in Switzerland) – and given the Cold War, the United States of America saw a benefit in an emerging european anti-soviet stronghold.

The first step in the EU founding process was set by the Schuman Declaration (May 1950). The then following negotiations led to the **Paris Treaty of 1951** where 6 countries decided to establish the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC, in force since July 1952). Interesting in this negotiation process was that the British, despite of stimulating the idea, decided to stay out and that Germany, still under economic

control of the USA and with the stigma of the “lately too powerful war-waging country”, was accepted as an equal partner (F: Monnet, G: Hallstein and Ophüls).

The obvious aim of the ECSC was to create a transparent market for the basic products needed for heavy and war industry to minimise the risk of hidden preparations for war. Another ambition of the “Europeans” was to balance the trade deficit with the US through federalist economic policies and to establish “european” rather than us-american control on resources.

And as the name of this contract “European Coal and Steel Community” sounds rather technical and dry, remember that France and Germany, having been enemies for some hundreds of years were two out of these six states (the others: Italy and the small states of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg): therefore this technical name covered the rather phantastic vision that well-established enemies would allow each other to control the mechanisms of their national war industry..... To guarantee this common goal of transparency, procedures of power balance between big and small states and decision-making procedures had to be defined, institutional bodies needed to be developed. Furthermore, it was hope by Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the EC that successful co-operation would lead to a so-called spill-over from dry technical policy fields on to more political ones like a common army, a common foreign policy etc.

I will lead you now through the stages of development and Treaties to find out which problems were solved already and which are still bothering the agents:

As the ESCS worked well, the 6 countries aimed to extend this step of integration to all other sectors of economy – the “Benelux-proposal for a common market” (1955, Messina; prep: Paul Henri Spaak). This decision was formalised in the **Treaties of Rome (signed 1957, ratified 1958)**, founding the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European

Atomic Community – Euratom. Euratom, designed to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy, was viewed by the French as a necessary boost for their plans to develop nuclear weapons.

The preamble of the Rome Treaties expressed the will to “establish the foundation of an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe”.

This term, “the peoples of Europe” leads us to one of the blind spots of the EU construction: the actors of european integration always were the Member States – that leaves the question what the role of citizens might be in the end ... in the 1950 and 60s this might not have been of main concern for the actors, but it surely is today

Anyway, these **three contracts**, the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom, were **merged in 1967** and the Council of Ministers as well as the European Commission, until today the two most powerful bodies of the institutional framework, were established. While the Council of Ministers as the main decision making body is drawn from the governments of the individual member states, the European Commission is the common bureaucracy to represent and carry out the european interest. This reflects the mixture of intergovernmental and supranational structures in the Community. The Treaty also provided for a Parliamentary Assembly, later renamed the European Parliament. Although the MEPs today (since 1979; envisaged in the Rome Treaties) are chosen by direct europeanwide elections, the Parliaments powers are described as being “advisory and supervisory” without real power on budget issues. Just to give you an example: almost 47% of the Union’s money is spent on the Common Agricultural policy – as you can imagine this was quite an important policy field after WW II. In order to keep that policy area out of the reach of MEPs it was decided to subsume it under the obligatory expenditures, which according to the Treaties are not subject to parliamentary co-decision.

But be aware, we are still speaking of a “Community of 6”: the first **enlargement** took place in 1973, when UK, Ireland and Denmark were accepted as new members. Greece was invited to join after their fascist

dictatorship was overcome and became a member in 1981. Similarly, Spain and Portugal were offered membership after the fascist Franco era, they joined the Communities in 1986. Already in those times the integration “into Europe” was something to offer young democracies to help them overcome their political as well as economic difficulties via integration into “the framework of western values”.

The first revision of the Treaties of the European Communities took place in 1986: it was called the Single European Act preceded by a very clever move by the then president of the Commission Jacques Delors who commissioned a study (Cecchini report) which analysed the costs of Non-Europe. This convinced the big European companies as well as the Heads of government – and the period of Euro-sclerosis was overcome by a fresh boost to the project: the European Single Act established, besides a further shift of power from the Nation State to the common European structure (principle of subsidiarity¹), the often mentioned “4 freedoms of movement” – the free movement of goods, capital, people and services.

1993 the **Maastricht Treaty** (based on the Delors report 1989, 3 steps towards a European Economic and Monetary Union) changed the contractual structure of the European Communities into the ever-closer cooperation framework of the European Union.

Core elements of this treaty were the foundation of the EMU setting the pace for realising the common currency, the Euro (1999; Greece joined 2001; introduced 2002) as well as the understanding on cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs issues and to form a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The famous image illustrating this construction is the one of the “Greek Temple” the 3 pillars the European Communities, the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs balancing the new roof, the European Union.

¹ SUBSIDIARITY: „In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. This clearly sounds like a basic principle of federalism.

And as another example of integration, the **Schengen Treaty** was negotiated – but not within the framework of the Treaties: here some member states decided to abolish the internal border controls in favour of stricter control at external borders combined with intensified internal police cooperation. It took some years until this Schengen agreement was transferred into the EU framework.

Watching this process of an ever closer union, in the **early 1990s Sweden, Finland, Austria and Norway applied for membership** – and after two years of negotiations Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the European Union in 1995 while the Norwegian people decided - by public referendum - to stay out.

What is rarely discussed, but nevertheless quite important, is how the European Union is financed: the whole structure is a self-financed one, the revenues streaming from sources, which were defined by the member states: there are contributions resulting from tariffs, levies on the import of specified products, a defined percentage of the value added tax in each member state and an annual contribution in percentages of each member states Gross National Product but not higher than 1,27% - a threshold never reached so far.

The expenditures vary as well: nearly 45% run into subsidies for agricultural products, another 35% go into the structural and cohesion policy sector (to balance with subsidies the regional economic differences). Research, culture, education and youth policies share another 6% of the budget expenditures, 5% are used for external relations, including humanitarian assistance, and another 5% are used to finance the administration of the Union. 3,4 % of the rest is used for special assistance for newly applying countries and negotiating the enlargement.

Following these developments, you can easily imagine how much discussion and diplomacy is going on at all levels to consult each other and to form common understanding of aims and targets and steps and

strategies: it might well be this vast “internal dialogue” that forms the “closer union”, as it makes a certain “know your neighbour well” a positive necessity for the next round of negotiation

Well, but back to structures. Since 1995 we have a Union of 15 member states, approximately 375 million people, an area of 3,2 million square kilometres and 11 working languages (danish, german, greek, spanish, french, italian, flemish/netherlands, portuguese, finnish, swedish and english; irish as additional language of the Treaties), since 2002 with a common currency for most of these members (not for the Danes, the Swedish and UK). The differences between the member states are huge:

- in size: a big country like Germany with 83 million and Luxemburg with no more than 440 thousand inhabitants
- in structure: from highly centralistic states like France to quite federal ones like Germany
- in budgetary terms: the GDPs as well as the level of unemployment and social security are drastically different between the member states

..... and these differences have to be balanced by the common administration to guarantee all member states accept the terms for their political participation and their chances to influence issues of core interest for their own nation. (To get an overview on those differences between the member states – and in comparison to the applicant countries, see transparency 1 in the addendum)

A plethora of problems arise from this structure, and they keep on doing so:

- the problem of the **balance between the struggle for unity while keeping the variety** – best illustrated by the question of translating all working documents of the Union into all working languages – and probably continuing to do so with 10 more languages.....
- a **basic democracy problem**: as the structure is supra national, it is not obvious who the **demos** is – the Member States or the

citizens..... and in a society that expects democratic procedures this should be clarified

- the problem of **adequate voter's representation**: in the European Council votes are biased by size of the country – with a strong tendency to cut short the big states by favouring the importance of small states
- The problem of **transparent policy making and consensus finding**: as media, political parties, civil society are still bound to national levels, policy making and consensus finding on EU level tends to be taking place behind closed doors, in the forum of the Council of Ministers, between the governmental representatives of the Member States. No other form for europeanwide policy making has been found yet – but citizens tend to be less and less confident about this. Therefore improvements are widely discussedThe main strands of suggestions comprise:
 - more power for the European Parliament and
 - the establishment of a Constitution for the European Union in order to limit the power of the executive and to introduce a European symbol fit to attract the loyalty of the citizenry.

2. Speculation: Where does Europe go to?

And now, in the light of these facts, we return to the basic question, where either none or hundreds of possible answers exist: What is Europe – and what should it be? Is Europe a **framework of treaties to push the economy**, is it the ultimate form of a **regionally integrated structure for peace** and wealth, is it an **emerging counterpart to the United States**, will it be a **loose cooperation framework for national interests**, is it an early stage of a **union of states**, a “United States of Europe”, a state in the making or a “**Federal Republic of Europe**”, according to the model of the Federal Republic of Germany?

If we briefly reflect about the main achievements during the last 50 years we discover a few interesting general characteristics of development:

- the **success story of avoiding armed conflict** between the member states by continuously using economic means to facilitate political cooperation
- a **unique structure of supranational cooperation**, established by the free will of the member states, established by jointly negotiated treaties, ratified by member states' parliaments binding the members to stick to the common legal framework
- a **network of state-like institutions, lacking civil-society-influenced state-like mechanisms** such as strong european political parties, european media or a fully fledged european constitution
- the view that the Union is **not a “closed club”, but a still unfinished process**

The question “what is EUrope” is basically a question about identity – and given the huge differences between member states it is not easy to find an obvious common identity: history and religion did more to divide than to unite the continent and in principle Europe is defined by her borders. Not that much by geographic borders – but by the hidden

borderlines of “who is one of us and who is not”. Nevertheless, there is this funny discussion going on at the moment if the whole of Russia or Turkey are part of Europe’s geographic or cultural sphere or not: as funny as this sounds, waves of discussion swept across the continent, reminding us on pros and cons that cover 2000 years of history: the fall of Byzanz ending the era of the Roman Empire, the wars of the Crusaders, the turkish attempts to conquer Europe, the Russian Empires policy towards Europe, the differences in mentality of both, the Russian orthodox church as well as the Islam – but as well of historic developments like Turkey’s early established secular state or the overcoming of soviet communism without civil war.

Fortunately, in the near future this discussion is expected to boil down to the simple question of “accept them in or not??”. The solution is likely to be found in the politically neutral way of establishing certain legal and economic criteria and then steer the prospective member states towards the achievement of these categories – or, given the political necessities, adapt the criteria.

Therefore, the core identity of Europe may not lay in shared values of which kind ever, but in the basic and broad understanding of all members that cooperation is simply more benefiting than conflict or pure national policy-making.

And formulating this less static and in more scientific terms as I might have to do for this audience, I would use the interpretation of the german social philosopher Habermas, looking a bit technical at first glance: With the term “constitutional patriotism” he characterises a society which does not “need to agree on the same set of values, but on the same procedures of how to set law and how to execute power”.

Personally, I would regard it realistic that this “agreement on terms” comes close to our shared identity. But this recognition leads to the insight, that this rather technical formula will not serve the identity-function of providing emotional stability by giving citizens the cosy feeling of “togetherness”. Anyway, citizens seem to find the emotional

parts of identity rather at the regional level than in a supranational framework. And this process is even re-enforced throughout the deepening of the Union's structures.

And so, while the nation state continuously loses his competence-competence function in the legal sense, we face a similar development in the sphere of identity: the role of the national state in securing common (national) identity does not seem to be of lasting importance.....

Wherever this will lead to, let me stop here the business of tea fig reading and move on to the two policy areas I promised to inform you about: Enlargement and the Convention Process, which are closely interrelated developments: if it would not be for the enlargement, it might still take ages until the Member States would agree on restructuring the European Union, which today is the task of the Convention Process.

3. The Enlargement Process

An enlargement process always follows the same script: the member-state-to-be sends an "application for membership" to the European institutions, the application is checked by the European Commission, then forwarded to the Council of Ministers. A European Council – comprising the Heads of State and governments - then invites the applicant for negotiations. "Negotiations" is a slightly misleading term, as this process has to achieve, that the applicant state makes his administrative and economic structures fit to implement the "Aquis communautaire", the whole legal framework of the EU. The EU does not accept changes or opting-outs in this phase, possible adaptations are transitional periods of time-limited deviations: of course these transitional periods may be in the interest of both sides: in the case of "full freedom for labour market mobility" the old member states are afraid of thousands of "freely moving workers" from countries with unemployment rates of nearly 20 percent.² So on behalf of the old

² Even since the preceding enlargement rounds did not trigger off large work migration....

member states a transitional period of 5 to 7 years for full labour market mobility was agreed upon(To get an overview on the actual state of the application for membership-process, please check transparency 2 in the addendum)

Mentioning fears, the core question of enlargement is touched: at one hand it is exactly because of the underlying fear of instability and conflict that Enlargement turns up to be THE political necessity. On the other hand, some effects of enlargement nourish new fears – especially in the age group of 45-70years old less educated people: inside the EU these people are afraid of the expected migration, as it might turn their living areas into less "austrian" or "german" ones and the concurrence of young, better educated people working for less money may easily cost them their jobs Working class people of the same age group in the accession countries mainly fear about the competitiveness of their company and workplace – often still in the agricultural sector ... - and about the foreigners (years ago the Soviets, now the Europeans....) coming and raising the prices for land or real estate: and I am not sure if it is correct to call these feelings "fears" as they are completely realistic and might well become true – at least partly. But it is difficult to say what the alternatives would be – as I mentioned before, the main motivation FOR the enlargement is the provision of political and economic stability.

It is a task for the institutions of both, the states and the European Union, to take care of these people who will lose by through enlargement by providing tailor-made social benefits

The applications for the recent enlargement process poured in during the early 1990s. On March 30th, 1998 the process was started officially with a conference of all Foreign Ministers – the 15s as well as the FMs of the 10 central- and eastern European Countries and Cyprus. Negotiations were started in 2 rounds, according to economic criteria defined by the European Commission. The first group started in March 1998 and included Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus. The second round started nearly 2 years later (February 2000)

with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Malta and the Slovak Republic.

After some time a political decision was taken to re-shuffle the members into a group of 10 states fit for earlier participation – and giving more time for preparation to Bulgaria and Romania.

There are other pending applications as well: Morocco, a north african state, applied in the mid-1980s and was rejected for geographical reasons. Switzerland's application is resting after the NO of the Swiss citizens in the public referendum on joining the European Economic Area. In the pipeline of procedures are at the moment Turkey and Croatia (application Feb. 2003). Turkey is already participating in some community programmes and receives EU grants for the preparation of accession. The time frame for the concrete start of negotiations will be agreed on by the end of this year. For Croatia the process of "country evaluation" did start in April 2003, further steps will have to be awaited.

4. The Convention Process

Already in 1993 at the summit of Copenhagen the Union agreed to enlargement towards Middle and Eastern Europe³. But then the summit of Essen (1994) clarified that at first the institutions of the EU need to be reformed. The institutional arrangements and its procedures of decision-making designed for a Community of 6 and continuously adapted to a Union of 15 member states are clearly too clumsy to function in a Union of 25 or more members.

This adaptation of structures should have happened at the Amsterdam summit in 1997 but the leftovers of Amsterdam included some of the main questions: the future size of the Commission, the weighting of

³ The Copenhagen Criteria for accession: 1. stable democracy with stable institutions (human rights, minority rights, multi party system, pluralism, legitimate legal system etc), 2. a well-established economy, fit for competition within the Single Market; 3. ability to implement the Aquis Communautaire; 4. acceptance of the aims of the Political Union and the Economic and Monetary Union.

votes in the Council, the extension of qualified majority etc.etc. The Nice Summit again failed to cope with this task, so at the Laeken Summit the decision was made to establish a "Constitutional Convention"⁴ with the task to restructure the legal and institutional framework of the European Union. It was also the style of negotiations in Nice – reminding of a bazaar of national interests and vanities - which led the participants to the conclusion that a new procedure for reforming the Treaties is needed. Thus, a Convention on the Future of Europe was set up, comprising 105 delegates from National Parliaments, the EP, national governments and the European Commission⁵, presided by the former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It took up its work in Spring 2002. The plenary of the Convent meets on a monthly basis, in between the members are engaged in 7 different working groups. Their thematic approach is a broad one, the contents of the working groups cover the whole range of legal and political problems: the objectives, values and fundamental principles of the Union shall be formulated, the network of competencies between the Union and the Member States as well as the legal personality of the Union shall be clarified, the procedures of Common Foreign and Security Policy shall be established, the Union's institutions and the exercise of the Union's competence shall be restructured, social cohesion shall be achieved and here I still have not mentioned all the various issues

Just now, the Convention is starting to deliver its results, which are discussed quite controversially in public. Anyway, at the next Intergovernmental Conference (second half of 2003 in Italy) the Heads of States and Governments will have to confirm or reject the Convention's proposals.

But concrete results and the question of what to do with them is just one side of the coin. In my perception the most interesting aspect is the

⁴ The earlier „Convention“, established to formulate the „Charta of Fundamental Rights“ obviously was seen as a successful model of working out complicated issues....

⁵ 15 delegates nominated by the governments of the EU member states (one per MS); 13 delegates nominated by the governments of the 13 applicant countries (one per country); 30 members of the national Parliaments of the MS (2 per MS); 26 parliamentarians – two per state- from accession countries; 16 Members of the European Parliament; 2 delegates of the European Commission; for each members a deputy was nominated;

effect this discussion process has and will have: parliamentarians, members of governments from inside and outside the Union as well representatives of supranational bodies (European Parliament and European Commission) took more than a year of their time to reflect and debate about the project and its future. And this in a quite transparent fashion, where representatives of business, lobby groups, universities and the so-called civil society taking part - despite of the fact, that the topics were highly complex. Simply the fact that this process is possible will change our expectations on transparency in policymaking and increase forms of participation for members of the civil society on various levels.

So, even while the future is an unknown sphere, I believe with this will and this ability to cooperate and develop, Europe is going to be on a good way.

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Transparency 1

<u>state</u>	<u>member</u>	<u>area</u>	<u>citizens</u>	<u>people/km2</u>	<u>unemployed</u>	<u>GDP</u>	← G 書式 表の
<u>Austria</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>96.8</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>196</u>	
<u>Belgium</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>336.4</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>233</u>	
<u>Denmark</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>124.1</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>163</u>	
<u>Finland</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>338</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>15.3</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>121</u>	
<u>France</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>544</u>	<u>59.8</u>	<u>109.4</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>1344</u>	
<u>Germany</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>357</u>	<u>82.3</u>	<u>230.4</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>117</u>	
<u>Greece</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>80.3</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>1982</u>	
<u>Ireland</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>54.5</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>85</u>	
<u>Italy</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>301</u>	<u>57.9</u>	<u>192.1</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>1099</u>	
<u>Luxemburg</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>171.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>18</u>	
<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>384.9</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>370</u>	
<u>Portugal</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>104</u>	
<u>Sweden</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>224</u>	
<u>Spain</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>505</u>	<u>39.5</u>	<u>78.3</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>559</u>	
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>244</u>	<u>59.8</u>	<u>245.3</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>1351</u>	
<u>EU</u>		<u>3234</u>	<u>377.6</u>	<u>116.7</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>7967</u>	
<u>Bulgaria</u>		<u>111</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>11.1</u>	
<u>Czech Republic</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>5.3</u>	
<u>Cyprus</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8.9</u>	
<u>Estonia</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>4.9</u>	
<u>Hungaria</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>45.6</u>	
<u>Latvia</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>5.9</u>	
<u>Lithuania</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>12.3</u>	<u>9.4</u>	
<u>Malta</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>1209</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>3.8</u>	
<u>Poland</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>313</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>151.3</u>	
<u>Romania</u>		<u>238</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>30.6</u>	
<u>Slovak Republic</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>19.9</u>	
<u>Slovenia</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>19.4</u>	
<u>Turkey</u>		<u>775</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>200.5</u>	
<u>Japan</u>	<u>not likely</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>126.8</u>	<u>336</u>	<u>5 (9)</u>	<u>4841.5</u>	

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany 2001
 area: in thousand km2,
 unemployment: 2000, candidate countries: 2001,
 GDP: in trillion Euro, 1999G; GDP/capita: Euro, 2000

Transparency 2

<u>State</u>	<u>Application</u>	<u>Negotiations</u>	<u>Referendum</u>	<u>Membership</u>
<u>Bulgaria</u>	<u>Dec. 1995</u>	<u>Feb. 2000</u>	<u>Not yet</u>	
<u>Croatia</u>	<u>Feb. 2003</u>	<u>EC country</u> <u>check starting</u>		
<u>Cyprus</u>	<u>July 1990</u>	<u>March 1998</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Czech Rep.</u>	<u>Jan. 1996</u>	<u>March 1998</u>	<u>June 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Estonia</u>	<u>Nov. 1995</u>	<u>March 1998</u>	<u>Sept. 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Hungary</u>	<u>March 1994</u>	<u>March 1998</u>	<u>April 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Latvia</u>	<u>Oct. 1995</u>	<u>Feb. 2000</u>	<u>Sept. 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Lithuania</u>	<u>Dec. 1995</u>	<u>Feb. 2000</u>	<u>May 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Malta</u>	<u>July 1990</u>	<u>Feb. 2000</u>	<u>March 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Poland</u>	<u>April 1994</u>	<u>March 1998</u>	<u>June 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Romania</u>	<u>June 1995</u>	<u>Feb. 2000</u>	<u>Not yet</u>	
<u>Slovak Rep.</u>	<u>June 1995</u>	<u>Feb. 2000</u>	<u>May 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Slowenia</u>	<u>June 1996</u>	<u>March 1998</u>	<u>March 2003</u>	<u>2004</u>
<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>May 1992</u>	<u>Pending... (?)</u>		
<u>Turkey</u>	<u>April 1987</u>	<u>Decision: end</u> <u>of 2004⁶</u>		

⁶ Decided at the Copenhagen Summit